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RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CHILDREARING
Peter Vallentyne*
INTRODUCTION

What rights and duties do adults have with respect to raising children? What
determines who, for example, has the right to decide how and where a particular
child will live, be educated, receive health care, and spend recreational time? More
concretely, what determines who a child's initial custodial parents are, who may
adopt a given child, who has what custodial rights in the case of divorce, when a
neglectful or abusive parent loses her custodial rights over a child, and what
visitation rights grandparents have? The commonsense view is that, under normal
procreative conditions, the biological parents have the right to raise their children
in any way that they see fit as long as they are not physically (or perhaps mentally)
abusing them. I shall argue that this view is mistaken. Neither biological (geneprovider) nor procreative (zygote-producer) parents have, in principle, any special
rights to raise their offspring. Instead, those rights can be legitimately claimed by
anyone for whom possession is suitably in the child's best interest. This Essay
asserts that those who so obtain childrearing rights have a duty to live up to the
"basic expectations" for ensuring that their possession of those rights is in the
child's best interest, but have no further duties to the child. If this is correct, then
custodial parents have significantly fewer rights over their children than is generally
thought.
I. BACKGROUND
I shall assume - controversially - that with respect to adult-to-adultrelations
some form of liberal egalitarianism is correct. More specifically, I shall assume that
adults (agents) are protected by certain kinds of general negative rights of personal
security (or bodily integrity),' and that, subject to the constraints imposed by these
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For discussion of why some kind of rights of personal security, and self-ownership
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rights, agents have some kind of (perhaps limited) general duty to promote equality
of life prospects in some appropriate sense (here left open) by promoting the life
prospects of individuals. It is assumed in this argument that there is no general duty
to help other adults except as required by the general duty to promote equality. Of
course, there can be various specialduties to help, based on specific past acts, such
as wrongdoings, commitments, or the like. Furthermore, agents who violate these
rights have a duty to compensate their victims to the extent that the agents are
responsible in a specified sense for the wrongful harms to the victims.
These are controversial assumptions. My purpose is not to defend them, but
rather to defend a view of how childrearing rights and duties fit into this picture.
II. THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
Childrearing rights are generally subordinate to certain rights that all children
have. In this section, I defend the claim that children have certain equality and
personal security rights that apply against everyone - including, with qualification,
their custodial parents. In the following sections, I discuss the rights and duties of
those who raise children.
Children, like adults, have certain rights of non-interference and rights to have
their life prospects improved by others when the demands of equality so require. I
thus reject the view that only autonomous agents can have rights. According to this
latter view - the choice-protectionview of rights - the sole purpose of rights is
the protection of autonomous choices. Since children and other sentient
nonautonomous beings do not have the capacity for autonomous choices, they do
not have any rights, and thus others owe them no duties. On this view, agents may
have duties to other agents with respect to nonagents (e.g., a duty to you not to harm
your child), but there are no duties owed to nonagents (e.g., no such duty to the
child).
This view simply does not make adequate sense of the duties that we have with
respect to children (and other sentient animals). We have duties to - and not
merely with respect to - children and these are grounded in some kind of constraint
protecting their interests. These duties are not impersonal duties (owed to no one),
because: (1) they do not apply when the children benefit suitably (there is no duty
to refrain from cutting open a child's body when this is part of a medical operation
that will maximally benefit the child); and (2) children are owed compensation when
these duties are violated. Nor are these duties (with respect to children) owed to
other agents, since they cannot be extinguished by all agents releasing each other
from this duty. The view that all rights protect choices fails, therefore, to capture,
the sense in which the duties that we have with respect to children are indeed owed
Critical Notice of G.A. Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, 28 CAN. J. PHIL.

609 (1998) (book review).
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to them. Furthermore, the fact that children cannot waive these duties, or even
enforce them (e.g., use force to prevent infringement or to extract compensation) is
quite irrelevant. The duties of others can be appropriately sensitive to the interests
of children (e.g., the use of physical force against them is forbidden unless it is
suitably in their interest), and other agents can enforce the duties on their behalf.2
I agree that the choice-protection view captures the primary rights that
autonomous agents have. I see no good reason, however, to assume that there can
only be one kind of right. Both conceptions of rights are coherent. The only
question is which kind is relevant for a given kind of being. Autonomous agents
have (primarily) choice-protecting rights, and nonautonomous sentient beings have
interest-protecting rights? Of course, as autonomy develops, the interest-protecting
duties owed to children are gradually supplanted by choice-protecting duties owed
to agents, but I shall not address the important issue of how and when this happens.'
For simplicity, I shall implicitly focus on the interest-protecting rights of
nonautonomous children.
Children have some rights, but what rights do they have? Recall, we are
assuming that adult agents have certain rights of personal security (e.g., against
nonconsensual contact with the body) and certain equality rights.' Children have
For discussions of the issues between choice-protecting and interesting-protecting
conceptions of rights, see MATTHEW H. KRAMER ET AL., A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS (1998);
HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994); WAYNE SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION
OF RIGHTS (1987); Samantha Brennan, Children's Choices or Children's Interests: Which
Do Their Rights Protect?, in CHILDREN AND POLITICAL THEORY (David Archard & Colin
MacLeod eds., 2002). For skepticism about whether all duties (and imperfect duties in
particular) owed to children can be captured by rights, see Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights
and Children'sLives, 98 ETHICS 445 (1988).
' Throughout, I remain neutral on what the child's interests are. More specifically, I
remain neutral on whether these necessarily include interests in the development of agency
2

in addition to interests in well-being. Hence, I remain neutral on the extent to which the

child's best interests typically require a suitably open future (and thus a certain kind of
neutrality in socialization). For a defense of the importance of ensuring a suitably open
future, see Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism,and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980) For criticism and refinement of this view, see Colin MacLeod,
Conceptions of ParentalAutonomy, 1997 POLITICS & SOCIETY 117

" The crucial point is that, when an individual becomes sufficiently autonomous for
certain kinds of decisions, the individual's consent becomes required to waive the right rather
than mere nonharm to the individual. Although the capacity for well-being is still present,
its moral significance is overridden by the capacity for autonomous choice when the latter
is present. For further discussion, see Hugh LaFollete, CircumscribedAutonomy: Children,
Care, andCustody, in HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN: UNCONVENTIONAL FAMILIES, HARD
CHOICES, AND THE SOCIAL GOOD (Uma Narayan & Julia J. Bartkowiak eds., 1999).

' Elsewhere, I have argued that those who procreate have a duty to their offspring even if they do not raise them - to ensure that their life prospects are non-negative (worth
living). This is another right of children that childrearing rights must respect, but for

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:991

both as well - although they are understood in interest-protecting terms. 6
Consider a child's interest-protecting right of personal security. It is exactly like
the adult right of personal security except that it does not rule out contact when the
child's interests are not adversely affected (as opposed to when the child has
consented). Performing beneficial surgery on a four-year old against her will does
not violate her rights of personal security, whereas it would normally violate those
of an adult. Performing pointless or needlessly dangerous surgery on a four-year
old, on the other hand, does violate her rights of personal security - even with her
consent. The relevant conception of harm here is the long-term setback of interests.
Thus, the mere presence of a short-term harm (the pain of surgery) is weighed
against long-term benefits. Agents are permitted to impose short-term bodily harms
on children - as long as the net long-term effects are suitably nonharmful.7
The crucial point is that once one recognizes that adults have rights of equality
and personal security, and that an interest-protecting conception of rights is possible,
it is arbitrary and implausible not to hold that children have those same rights
understood in interest-protecting terms. Rights place constraints on what others may
do to the right-holder. Such protection is important for beings with interests even
if they are not autonomous. For autonomous beings, this protection is controlled by
their will (e.g., their valid consent is necessary for permissible breach). For
nonautonomous beings with interests, the protection is sensitive to their interests.
There is no reason for only autonomous beings to be protected by rights. Children,
I conclude, have rights of personal security and of equality.
Whatever rights custodial parents have are constrained, with qualification, by
the rights of children to personal security and equality. The right of personal
security limits the rights of parents to use physical force against their children. The
right of equality limits the rights of parents to prevent others from providing equality
benefits to which the child is entitled.' Thus a Jehovah's Witness has no right to
simplicity I shall ignore ithere. See Peter Vallentyne, Equalityandthe DutiesofProcreators,
in CHILDREN AND POLITICAL THEORY (David Archard & Colin MacLeod eds., 2002).
6 Child-liberationists argue that children have the same rights of self-determination as
adults. They implicitly endorse choice-protecting rights for children with at least a basic
rational competency. No one, however, endorses choice-protecting rights for neonates. For
an argument against choice-protecting rights for children, see LAURA PURDY, INTHEIR BEST
INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1992).

" I assume throughout this Essay that the interest-protecting rights of children protect
their interests directly in the sense that whether a right is infringed by a particular action is
determined by the impact of that action on the holder's well-being. Rights so understood are
not infringed when no harm is done to the holder. Indirect interest-protecting rights, by
contrast, ground the content of rights in the instrumental benefits to the holder of having
those rights, and such rights may be infringed even if the holder is not harmed. A full defense
of the proposed view would thus require a defense of the direct view against the indirect
view.
IIndeed, the parent often has a duty to the child to provide such benefits. We'll examine
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prevent others from providing medical treatment to her child when the child's
equality rights require that others provide such treatment.9 Nor does an Amish
parent have any right to prevent others from providing a high school education to
her child when the child has an equality right to such an education.'" Of course, not
all forms of medical treatment or education are required by the equality rights of a
given child, but for those that are, parents have no rights to prevent others from
providing such benefits. I shall not attempt to spell out in detail the exact content
of the equality rights that children (and adults) have. My claim is simply that,
whatever they are (and I believe that they are fairly robust), they constrain the
childrearing rights of parents.
Ill. CHILDREARING RIGHTS
Who has the right to raise a given child, and what rights do they have over the
child? I shall defend a radically strong child-centered conception of childrearing
rights. Childrearing rights over a given child belong to those for whom possession
is suitably in the child's best interest." In the next section, I will address the duties
of those with childrearing rights.'2 This section focuses on the rights.
Let us call a person with childrearing rights over a given child a "custodial
parent." There are two kinds of childrearing rights that we must consider: (1) rights
against others that they not interact with the child except with permission of the
custodial parents (e.g., that others not take the child to the beach without the
custodial parents' permission); and (2) special rights against the child (e.g., the
liberty to punish her in ways that are normally ruled out by the child's personal
security rights). We shall consider each in turn.
A. Childrearing Rights Against Others
Childrearing rights against others are, as indicated above, restricted by the rights
of children to personal security and equality. First, others are not permitted to
violate the child's rights - even with the custodial parent's permission. Second,
others are permitted to interact with the child in ways to which the child has a (e.g.,
equality) right - even without the custodial parent's permission. More generally,
others are permitted to have contact with the child if, and only if: (1) it does not
infringe the child's rights; and (2) they have either (a) permission from the custodial
the duties of parents in a later section.
9 E.g., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
10 E.g., State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1971).
For excellent discussions of childrearing and related rights, see DAVID ARCHARD,
CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD (1993); JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN:
THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY (1982).
2

See infra Part IV.
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3
parents, or (b) a duty to the child to have such contact.
Typically, it is in a child's interests to have an autonomous agent (or a small set"
thereof) who has rights to control the child's interactions with others. This is
typically valuable because the agent overseeing these interactions will look out for
the child's interests and in doing so will help develop special bonds of affection that
are in the child's interest. The benefits to the child are the main justification for
childrearing rights. They are not, however, the sole considerations. The expected
effect of the childrearing rights on the child's disposition to violate the rights of
others is also relevant. An individual acquires childrearing rights just in case her
possession of those rights, in a precise manner that I will explain below, ensures that
the child will respect the rights of others and suitably promotes the child's interests.
Let me start by explaining the condition concerning the child's disposition to
violate the rights of others. The condition that I shall impose is relatively weak in
order to give more strength to the child's best interest condition. First, the rights violation condition is concerned with expected compensation shortfalls from rights
violations - as opposed to rights violations as such. It is not concerned with cases
where the child goes on (as an adult or partially autonomous child) to violate the
rights of others and then fully compensates all the victims. Of course, it is better
that there be no rights violations than that there be rights violations with full
compensation. The weaker condition (which only concerns rights violation for
which full compensation is not provided) is nonetheless more plausible because it
gives more room for taking the child's best interests into account. A second way
that the proposed rights violation condition is relatively weak is that it requires the
compensation shortfalls be no worse than they would be if no one had child-rearing
rights, but not that the shortfalls be as low as possible. Again, this leaves
appropriate room for the child's best interests to be taken into account.
Under what conditions, then, does a person acquire childrearing rights against
others? A person acquires such rights when she claims those rights and the
following three conditions are met. First, possession of the childrearing rights by
this person is no worse for the child, and no worse for others with respect to
compensation shortfalls from the child's rights violations, than having no one
possess childrearing rights over the child. Call this the no-custodian condition. It
requires that the expected benefit for the child be no less, and that the expected
compensation shortfalls to each other person be no greater, than they respectively
would be if no one were to possess childrearing rights against others with respect to
the child. Second, possession of the childrearing rights by this person must be at
least as good for the child (in terms of expected benefits) as possession by anyone
else who both claims the rights and satisfies the no custodian condition. Call this
the best-custodian condition. Together, these conditions hold that a person has

,3 In which case custodial parents have no authority to block such contact and their
permission is not needed.
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childrearing rights over a child only if she claims them and it is in the (expected)
best interests of the child for this person to have these childrearing rights, as
compared to having no custodian or some other interested custodian for whom the
no-custodian condition is satisfied. These two conditions are sufficient to justify
childrearing rights in cases where there is no tie for the best interests of the child.
Where there is a tie, a third condition is needed. Call this the tie-breakingcondition.
Iam inclined to defend the view that in cases of ties, the person who first claims the
childrearing rights acquires those rights, but there are other possibilities. One is that
the claimant who would get the greatest benefit acquires those rights. I will not
attempt to resolve this issue, and shall leave open the exact nature of the tie-breaking
condition. In the interest of brevity, I shall ignore this condition.
The basic picture is this: If no one claims childrearing rights over a child (e.g.,
an abandoned child or an orphan), anyone may do anything she wants with the child
as long as doing so does not infringe upon the child's equality and personal security
rights. Typically, of course, the procreative parents will claim the rights to raise the
child. If, however, the possession of these rights would be worse for the child, or
produce an expected compensation shortfall for someone that is greater than the nocustodian level, 4 then the procreative parents have no childrearing rights over their
offspring. If, on the other hand, the procreators pass the no-custodian test, then they
must meet a second condition. Their possession of the childrearing rights must be
at least as good for the child as possession by anyone else who claims the rights and
passes the no-custodian test. If the interests of the child would be better served by
some other interested party having the childrearing rights, then the procreators do
not have childrearing rights. If, however, the parents uniquely satisfy the best
interests of the child condition, then the procreators have the rights to raise the child.
Once acquired, for how long do childrearing rights last? One view is that they
last only for as long as the no custodian and best custodian conditions continue to
hold. On this view, if someone arrives and claims the childrearing rights and they
would be a better custodial parent, then the previous custodial parents lose their
childrearing rights. The problem with this view is that it may be in the child's
interest for the childrearing rights to be more secure. The problem is not that a
change in custodial parents could be highly damaging to the child (given her need
for secure, long-term, intimate bonds). This very important consideration can be
factored into the determination of who should receive the childrearing righis, and
doing so makes it unlikely that a change in custody will be in the child's interest.
Rather, the problem here is that, under some conditions, some individuals who
would be superb custodial parents may not desire this role because of the possibly
temporary nature of the rights. A more permanent set of custodial rights might
increase the pool of parties interested in claiming those rights, and thus be in the
better interests of the child.
"4This will be true only for parents who are incredibly bad influences on their children!
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A more plausible approach is that the duration of the childrearing rights is a
contingent matter that is determined at the time of acquisition by the best interests
of the child. Under some conditions (e.g., ones in which there is a high demand for
childrearing rights), the rights may apply only as long as the no-custodian and bestcustodian conditions continue to hold. Under other conditions (e.g., where there is
a low demand for childrearing rights), the rights may continue relatively
unconditionally until the child reaches adulthood. In what follows, I shall assume
that generally, childrearing rights, once acquired, are relatively permanent. Even so,
the rights are still conditional on living up to the basic expectations implicit in the
justification of their acquisition (i.e., the no-custodian and best-custodian
conditions). Parents who do not live up to those expectations that justified their
acquisition of childrearing rights lose those rights (if contested by a better parent).
Childrearing rights are acquired by those for whom possession is in the best
interests of the child. The claim is not that children have a right to be brought up by
those who would give them the best upbringing. It is only that they have an
immunity right not to be brought up by certain individuals when other willing
individuals would do a better job for the child. Those for whom possession of
childrearing rights would best promote the child's interests have the moral power
to obtain those rights, but they generally do not have a duty to exercise that power
and acquire the childrearing rights. Agents do have duties to promote equality and
sometimes this will require them to raise certain children, but this is not always so.
The proposed view concerns who may acquire childrearing rights over a child, and
not who has a duty to take on those rights.
Note that the claim is not that those who have childrearing rights have a duty to
provide the best upbringing they can for the child. No claim is being made here
about the duties of custodial parents.' To this point, the claim only concerns the
conditions under which one can acquire childrearing rights over a child.
Above, and in what follows, I write as if the rights to raise a child are an
indivisible bundle of rights. Of course, this is not so. It may be in the child's best
interest to have some (or all) of the childrearing rights divided among various
individuals. For example, it may be in the child's best interest for the rights to raise
her to be divided among a couple, the parents of the couple (i.e., the grandparents),
and certain state officials. Of course, the possibility of dividing up the rights
introduces many complications. One is that the relevant test for a given childrearing
right would have to be whether possession is part of a rights-division scheme (of
which there will be many) that is in the child's best interests. For simplicity I
address the issue as if childrearing rights are not to be divided up, and will instead
be held entirely by some person or set of persons. In so doing, I am admittedly
neglecting many important issues that need to be addressed.
The proposed view of childrearing rights can be criticized (1) for not adequately
"5 See infra Part IV.
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recognizing the childrearing rights of biological, procreative, or custodial parents,
(2) for not adequately recognizing societal interests, (3) for not adequately
recognizing child interests, and (4) for giving undue advantage to the rich. I shall
consider each in turn.
The proposed view, it may be objected, fails to give biological and procreative
parents any special rights to raise their offspring. This flies in the face of common
sense. I agree, but unreflective common sense is mistaken.
An extreme way of generating special childraising rights for biological or
procreative parents is to hold that they fully own their children either on the ground
(for biological parents) that they owned the material resources (germs cells) that
were the origin of the child or on the ground (for procreative parents) that they
performed the actions that created the child. 6 If this claimed full ownership of
offspring concerns offspring who have no moral standing (e.g., zygotes, on some
views), this view may not be implausible. It is, however, grossly implausible as it
concerns children with moral standing. Such children cannot be fully owned by
another."
There is, however, a weaker way of grounding special child-rearing rights for
biological or procreative parents. It is to claim that the children arepartiallyowned
by their biological or procreative parents (depending on the account offered). These
parents have full private ownership of their nonadult offspring except as constrained
by the rights of the children. This view corresponds to the proposed view except
that it claims that those rights are held by the biological or procreative parents and
not by the claimant whose possession of the rights is in the child's best interest.
Both views recognize the rights of the child. The difference concerns whether the
biological or procreative parents hold the residual rights over the child or whether
those rights are held by the interested person(s) for whom possession is in the child's
best interest.
Why might one think that procreative or biological parents partially own their
children? It is presumably based on the idea that those who own all the factors of
production (labor, raw materials, etc.) for a given product also own the product. At
least where a child is intentionally produced (and perhaps in a much wider range of
cases), this provides a reason for thinking that procreators typically partially own
A person who donates or sells his/her germs cells to others may not be a procreative
parent.
"7Hillel Steiner defends the view that procreators own their very young children on the
ground that they own the factors of their production. See STEINER, supra note 2, at 229-65;
Hillel Steiner, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Differentials and Distributive
Justice, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (Justine Burley ed., 1999).
For elaboration on the criticism of the ownership argument, as well as on the appeal to the
best interests of the child, see ARCHARD, supra note 11, at 97-109 (1993); SUSAN MOLLER
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 74-88 (1989); David Archard, What's Blood Got
to Do with It? The Significance of NaturalParenthood,I RES PUBLICA 91 (1995).
6
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their offspring." Many will reject the general producer-ownership principle, but I
am inclined to grant its plausibility where the products have no moral standing. in
the case of children who have moral standing, an unqualified version of this
principle would say that procreators fully own their children, but this is just plain
crazy. We therefore consider a qualified version that grants ownership only to the
extent it is compatible with the rights of the child.
My claim is that the child's best interests determine who has the right to raise
the child, and not facts about biological or procreative origin. This is not to deny
that facts about biological and procreative origin are relevant for determining who
has the right to raise a given child. They may well be. All things being equal, if
biological or procreative parents tend to better look after the child, then they will
tend to have the right to raise their children. Biological or procreative parenthood,
however, is only indirectly relevant (and only because of the connection with
effectiveness in promoting the child's interests), and such status is only one of many
factors in this regard. Of course, given the limitations in our knowledge about the
impact on the child of various childrearing arrangements, it is plausible on
pragmatic grounds to presume that biological or procreative parents have the right
to raise their child, with the burden of proof lying with others who want to raise the
child instead. In principle, however, biological and procreative parents as such have
no special right to raise their child.
A second and closely related objection is that the proposed view does not
adequately recognize the very profound interest that many people have in raising
children - especially their biological or procreative offspring. 9 Some social
theorists argue that the right to raise one's biological or procreative offspring
follows from the parents' rights of noninterference when pursuing their own projects
(e.g., forming intimate relationships).2" A first reply is that the proposed view is
sensitive to this fact. It allows people to acquire childrearing rights over children
under appropriate conditions. The only issue concerns what the appropriate
conditions are. No one thinks that anyone who wants to raise a given child (even
if it is his or her biological or procreative offspring) has a right to do so. If the
person is likely to physically abuse the child, he is likely to have no such right. The
18

See STEINER, supra note 2, at 229-65.

"9 For arguments in favor of the fundamental relevance of parental interests (in addition
to child interests) in determining childrearing rights, see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM
CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 204-57 (2000); Samantha Brennan & Robert
Noggle, The Moral Status of Children: Children's Rights, Parents' Rights, and Family
Justice, 23 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1997); Donald C. Hubin, From Children's Rights to
Parent's Rights (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
20 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 152 (1978). For criticism of this view,
see ARCHARD, supra note 11, at 97-109, 122-32; Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an
Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE
POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980); Gutmann, supra note 3.
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issue thus concerns the qualifications an individual must have in order to have the
right to raise a -particular child. The proposed view admittedly establishes very
strong child-centered conditions: possession of the childrearing rights must be
suitably in the child's best interest. Those who have a deep interest in raising some
particular child therefore have a strong incentive for ensuring that they meet this
condition. Of course, this will not always be possible. When it is not, there is a
conflict between the prospective parent's interests and the child's interests. Given
that the child has independent moral standing, and the rights at issue are rights to
control access to the child, it is quite plausible that the child's interests take priority
over the potential custodial parent's interests. A man's profound interest in having
a relationship with a given woman does not give him any rights to control access to
her. The situation with children is no different.
A third objection challenges the legitimacy of childrearing claim-rights in
general. James Dwyer, for example, has argued that custodial parents have a
presumptive privilege (or liberty) to raise their children, but they have no claimrights against interference from others when doing so. Custodial parents are
presumptively permitted to raise their children in various ways, but, if they are not
doing a good job, others (e.g., agents of the state) are also permitted to intervene and
restrict or eliminate the parental influence. Dwyer rejects claim-rights over children
on several grounds." First, the primacy of the child's interests generates rights for
the child - and no claim-rights for custodial parents. I agree fully that children
have rights and that these rights are essential for protecting their interests. The only
question is whether childrearing rights by others are also a useful way of protecting
children's interests. Dwyer argues that parental motivation and behavior are
unlikely to be affected by whether they have a mere privilege to raise their children
or a claim-right to do so. I suspect that he is mistaken on this factual issue, but the
crucial point is that it is not necessarily true. It is at least possible that the interests
of children will be better promoted by someone having a right to control access to
them than by simply having aprivilege to do so. When this is so, and the expected
compensation shortfalls of others are not adversely affected, then childrearing rights
are justified. The best interests of the child require this.
Dwyer suggests, however, that even here childrearing rights are illegitimate on
the ground that an agent having the right to control access to a child is incompatible
with respecting the equal personhood (or status as end-in-itself) of the child and the
agent. I agree that it is incompatible with equal moral status if one agent
nonconsensually has the right to control access to another agent. Additionally, I
agree that children are ends-in-themselves. I disagree that non-autonomous sentient
beings - such as children - have equal moral status with agents. Precisely
See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 62-101
(1998). Although the specifics of his approach are very different from those defended here,
he too defends a radically child-centered approach to child-rearing rights.
21
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because they are not capable of autonomous choice, their will does not have the
same moral significance as it does for agents. Children have comparable moral
status as agents, meaning that they have the same rights except understood in
interest-protecting rather than choice-protecting terms. One agent having rights to
control access to a child, however, is compatible with the comparable moral status
of children and agents. First of all, such childrearing rights are constrained by the
basic rights (e.g., of personal security and equality) of the children. Second, the
childrearing rights hold only where their possession is suitably in the best interest
of the child. Together these features ensure that children are treated as comparable
ends-in-themselves. There is thus no conceptual error or illegitimacy in agents
having childrearing rights.
A fourth objection acknowledges that custodial parents have certain childrearing
rights but claims that the rights are not as strong as posited by the proposed view.
The child's custodial parents may have, on the proposed view, the right to refuse to
provide various benefits to the child (for example, a beneficial medical treatment or
educational experience) and the right to prevent others from providing such benefits.
This may seem to give inadequate consideration to the interests of the child. There
are two relevant points to be made here. First, if the child is entitled to these
benefits because she is suitably below average (if she has an equality right to them),
then the parents may have an equality duty to provide the benefits and definitely
have no right to prevent those who have such a duty from providing them.
Therefore, the objection only applies to benefits to which the child has no equality
right. Second, if the parent is systematically failing to provide benefits and
preventing the provision of such benefits by others, then it becomes more likely she
will cease to have the right to raise the child. It makes it more likely that she will
not live up to the basic expectations thatjustified her possession of the right to have
childrearing rights. Thus, to the extent that others are interested in raising the child,
there is a natural limit to the extent to which custodial parents can refuse or prevent
the provision of benefits to the child. Once these two points are taken into
consideration, the posited childrearing rights can be seen not to be too strong.
A fifth objection is that the proposed view does not adequately take into account
the societal interest in raising children to be morally virtuous adults or at least to
respect the rights of others. It is true that the conditions justifying childrearing
rights are based primarily on the interests of the child, but the societal interest in
having the child raised to respect rights is taken into consideration - although
admittedly in a very weak manner. A necessary condition for possession of
childrearing rights is the no-custodian condition, which holds, in part, that
possession of the childrearing rights by a person must not increase anyone's
expected compensation shortfall from the child beyond what it would be if no one
possessed childrearing rights. This eliminates custodial rights for those who would
have an extremely corrupting influence on the child.
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Still, the no-custodian condition is, at least for very young children, extremely
weak, and it is argued that a much stronger condition is needed. One argument
holds that possession of childrearing rights does not depend merely on how well one
could reduce rights violations and failures of compensation by the offspring. The
right also depends on how virtuous the custodial parent is likely to make the child.
Another objection holds that the focus should be on rights violations rather than
compensation shortfalls. A third objection is that even if the focus is solely on
compensation shortfalls, this concern should require minimization of expected
compensation shortfalls (prior to taking the child's interests into account) rather than
merely not increasing them from their no-custodian levels. The core reply to each
of these objections is the same. Any strengthening of the condition concerning
societal interests weakens the role of the child's interests. This is inappropriate
given that the child has independent moral standing and that childrearing rights give
someone the rights to control access to the child. Such control needs to be justified
almost exclusively in terms of the benefits to the child. Furthermore, societal
interests in raising the child can be accommodated by providing incentives and
opportunities for the child to develop in the desired ways (through parental training
programs, preschool and school programs, etc.). The very weak no-custodian
condition is not too weak in this regard.
A sixth and final objection to the proposed view is that it unfairly disadvantages
those who are already disadvantaged. A child's interests will, all else being equal,
typically be better served by having rich, educated, and otherwise privileged
custodial parents than by having poor, uneducated, and otherwise disadvantaged
parents. Thus, privileged individuals are more likely to obtain childrearing rights
than disadvantaged ones. Given the centrality of childrearing to many people's life
plans, many egalitarians will object to this anti-egalitarian feature. A first reply is
that in a world in which everyone fulfills their duties - including their egalitarian
duties - this situation will not arise, at least not in any significant way. To the
extent that the situation of the disadvantaged is magnified by the greater difficulty
in obtaining childrearing rights, the demands of equality to help them will increase.
Thus, in a world of full compliance, this is unlikely to be a significant problem.
In the real world, of course, the proposed account may indeed magnify the
disadvantage of the already disadvantaged. Unconstrained egalitarians would hold
that sometimes the interests of the child must be sacrificed to help the severely
disadvantaged who desperately want to raise the child (but for whom custodial rights
are not in the best interests of the child). This reflects the fact that unconstrained
egalitarianism does not place constraints on how equality may be promoted.
Unconstrained egalitarianism is, for that reason, implausible. Torturing innocents
to promote equality, for example, is not permissible. Given that children have moral
standing with rights, and given that childrearing rights are rights to control access
to children, the acquisition of childrearing rights must be grounded in the best
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interests of the child. Although this account of childrearing rights is less egalitarian
than an account that allocates rights solely on the basis of what would maximize
equality, it is in accord with the general spirit of the form of liberal egalitarianism
22
that I am presupposing.
B. ChildrearingRights Against the Child
Thus far, I have focused on the rights of custodial parents to control the access
of others to the child. I shall briefly address two kinds of childrearing right against
the child herself.
One kind of childrearing right against the child is a claim-right that the child
obey custodial parent. This makes sense only if the child is capable of having
duties; it does not make sense for very young children. The issue of what duties
children have to their parents is one that is handled by the justificatory conditions
introduced above. If the imposition of duties of the child to the parent is in the best
interests of the child - for example, if it would attract better qualified parties, or if
it would increase the motivation of the interested parties - then the child acquires
certain duties in exchange for the benefits of the duties acquired by the custodian
parents. Exactly what duties the child acquires is a contingent matter and largely
influenced by convention. Although I shall not argue it here, it seems plausible that
in the real world children do, while still children, have some duties of obedience to
their parents. More controversial, and here left unsettled, is whether they have
duties of obedience or duties to look after their parents after the children become
adults.
A second kind of childrearing right that custodial parents could have is a liberty
to treat them in ways that would normally violate the children's rights of equality
or personal security (e.g., to punish them when this is not in the child's best
interest). Under certain, but unlikely, circumstances, it might be in a child's best
interest for the custodial parents to have such liberties, and for the child to lose the
corresponding right. For example, it might arise that someone would be a more
beneficial custodial parent for the child than anyone else (and better for the child
than having no custodial parent), but that this person would not undertake the task
of raising the child unless she had the unrestricted right to beat the child. Even after
factoring in the negative effect of such beatings, the net benefit for the child
provided by the custodial parent might be much greater than any other feasible
arrangement. Under such conditions the custodial parent acquires a liberty to treat
the child in ways that would normally be impermissible.
A full defense of this view would require addressing several further issues. One
is the possibility that the child has an impersonal immunity to loss of first order
rights. Such an immunity is not a right because it is not sensitive to the interests or
22

A defense of this general view is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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the choices of the holder. Strict inalienability of a right is an impersonal immunity.
I would argue against this view on the ground that there are no impersonal
immunities (nor any impersonal duties, etc.). All normative protections are
grounded in the interests or choices of individuals, and immunities in particular are
grounded in the interests or choices of the individuals having the immunity.
Obviously, this is a highly controversial claim and I shall not defend it here.
I shall not pursue the issue of the immunity of the child to the loss of first order
rights, because in practice it is unlikely to be relevant. Cases in which it is in a
child's interest to lose certain rights against someone (e.g., custodial parent) are sure
to be extremely rare, and even when they occur we are unlikely to have sufficient
evidence that they have occurred. Hence, for practical purposes we can, I believe,
assume that in general the first order rights of children apply even against custodial
parents.
IV. CHILDREARING DUTIES

Procreative parents (those who bring a child into existence) have various duties
to their offspring and these may well include raising the child if no other interested
party would do a better job. I have addressed this issue elsewhere23 and will not
here explore the specifics of this theory. Individuals generally have an additional
duty to promote equality of life prospects and often this duty will require that one
raise children that one did not create. Children are especially likely to be
beneficiaries of the duty to promote equality because typically, for a given resource
expenditure, one can have a much greater impact on a person's life prospects when
she is young than when she is old. The duty to raise children is exhausted by the
special duties of procreative parents and the general duties to promote equality. I
shall not, however, defend this view here. Instead, I shall focus on the duties of
those who, for whatever reason, acquire childrearing rights.
What childrearing duties do custodial parents have? As argued above, they have
(with the qualification given above) the general duties that everyone has to respect
the rights of the children to personal security and equality. The only special
childrearing duties that custodial parents have, I argue, are those based on
commitments and the basic expectations that justified their acquisition of
childrearing rights. Because these expectations involve both the provision of
benefits to the child and steps to limit the child's compensation shortfalls to others,
custodial parents have special duties both to the child and to other members of
society.
The basic idea is this: those with childrearing rights acquire them primarily
because (1) their possession is no worse for the child and no worse for others with
23 See Peter Vallentyne, Equality and the Duties of Procreators,in THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 195 (David Archard & Colin M. MacLeod eds, 2002).
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respect to compensation shortfalls than if no one possesses those rights, and (2) their
possession of the rights is expected to be in the child's best interests relative to those
who satisfy the first condition and are interested in possessing those rights. One
way individuals may make it more likely that these conditions are satisfied is by
making binding commitments to the child or to others to do various things for the
child. Moreover, prospective and current custodial parents of a child may make
binding commitments to each other as a way of protecting the interests of the child
they love. If individuals voluntarily make such commitments, they do indeed have
an obligation to honor them. In addition, even where no commitment to others is
made concerning aspects of the parenting activities, there are the expectations based
on how the childrearing rights were permissibly acquired. In exchange for the
childrearing rights over the child, the custodial parents acquire the duty to live up
to those expectations. Custodial parents have no duty in general to live up to all
these expectations, but they do have a duty to the child to live up to enough of the
expectations so as to satisfy the original justificatory conditions. If the original
expectations only barely met thejustificatory conditions, then all these expectations
must be met. However, if the original expectations exceeded the justificatory
conditions, then some of them need not be met. Except as required by the basic
expectations, custodial parents have no specialduty (in virtue of being the custodial
parents) to the child to ensure that all a child's needs are met, to do the best they can
for the child, or to ensure that the child's life prospects are at least average.24
Most will object that the proposed view imposes too few duties on custodial
parents, but first let us consider the objection that it imposes too many duties.
Francis Schrag has argued that children have no rights against their parents on the
ground that rights fail to take into account adequately, and even interfere with, the
important affective relationship between parent and child.25 This argument can take
the extreme form of saying that children literally have no rights against their
custodial parents - not even rights of personal security - or the more moderate
form of saying that children have no special rights against their custodial parents.
Under normal circumstances, neither form of the objection is plausible. Normally,
The proposed view holds that acquiring childrearing rights generates certain duties (to
live up to basic expectations). An alternative view holds that taking on custodial duties
generates certain rights, I reject the latter view, since I deny that a person who takes on
certain custodial duties has any childrearing rights if his or her possession is not in the best
interests of the child. For discussion of this opposing view, see ARCHARD, supra note !1, at
97-109; BLUSTEIN, supranote 11, at 101; David Archard, ChildAbuse: ParentalRights and
the Interests of the Child, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RE-VISIONED (1996). Note, however, that
24

Archard also holds that the right to rear is conditional upon the discharge of the duty to give
the child the best possible upbringing. ARCHARD, supra note 11, at 138. Therefore, the
differences in the two approaches may not be as great as it may seem.
2 See Francis Schrag, Children: Their Rights and Needs, in WHOSE CHILD?, supra note
20, at 237.
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custodial parents are not permitted to beat their children when it is harmful to them,
and custodial parents have a duty to provide at least some kind of care-giving.
Furthermore, these duties are not merely impersonal duties; they are owed to the
children.
Many commentators argue that the proposed view is too weak. It is argued that
the proposed view requires too little of custodial parents with respect to promoting
the child's interests. Children, it is claimed, have a right against their custodial
parents to the upbringing that (within the limits of morally permissible behavior) is
in their best interest - or at least to an upbringing that ensures that their basic needs
are met (e.g., nutrition, shelter, basic medical care and basic education). Under the
proposed view, however, the duties of custodial parents to their wards are based on
the basic expectations involved in their acquisition of the childrearing rights. These
duties can be minimal if no one else wants to raise the child (e.g., if the child has
features that repel most people).
Several points make the proposed view plausible. First, it is implausible to hold
that custodial parents always owe their wards the best possible upbringing that they
can provide. This would be extremely demanding of them. It would require
custodial parents to give almost no consideration to their own interests. It is
implausible that custody always requires such a radical sacrifice. The proposed
view allows that the duties of custodial parents may indeed be quite onerous, but,
where this is so, it is because there are many highly qualified people interested in
having the childrearing rights over the child. In such cases, the basic expectations
implicit in the justificatory conditions for childrearing rights may be quite
demanding. In such cases, it would be unfair to the child not to require the custodial
parents to live up to these basic expectations. There is, however, no reason to think
that in general, custodial parents must always do what is best for their ward.
Still, one might object that custodial parents at least owe their wards a duty to
ensure that their basic needs are met. This is indeed part of common sense, but
common sense is mistaken. In addition to the duties custodial parents owe a given
child, there are the duties that the procreative parents (who need not be the custodial
parents) owe the child, and perhaps (if she is sufficiently disadvantaged) the equality
duties that others owe her. If there is a duty to ensure that a child's basic needs are
met, it is held either by the procreative parents or by agents in general. If the
procreative parents deliberately and needlessly brought the child into existence with
severe disabilities or into a world of severe scarcity of resources, they may be
responsible for meeting the basic needs of the child. If the child has severe unmet
needs because bad brute luck (e.g., unforeseeable disease), then everyone may have
an equality duty to help ensure that her needs are met. There is no reason, however,
to single out the custodial parents as such. They have the childrearing rights
because their possession is in the best interests of the child. They do indeed have
various special duties to the child, but there is no reason to suppose that these duties
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must include the duty to ensure that all needs are met. Typically, they will include
these duties, but if the circumstances are dire, they may not. This is not to deny that
good parents will always try to ensure that their children's needs are met. It is only
to deny that they always have a duty to do so.
A second objection is that the proposed views requires too little of custodial
parents with respect to raising the child to be good citizens. Not only does it not
require custodial parents to raise the child to be as virtuous as possible, it does not
even require them to raise the child to respect the rights of others.26 All that is
required is that the custodial parents not increase the offspring's expected
compensation shortfall to anyone from what it would be if no one were the custodial
parent of the child from that point forward. Given that children without custodial
parents are likely to engage in numerous rights violations, that is an extremely low
standard. Typically, it will not be as low as it seems. First, if the police and prison
systems, as well as social sanctioning practices, are reasonably effective, then it will
generally be in the child's interest to be raised to respect the rights of others. Thus,
to the extent that custodial parents are required to look out for the child's interest,
they will tend to have a duty to foster a respect for the rights of others. Second, it
will also tend to be in the custodial parent's interest simply because they will tend
to want their child to respect rights. Third, it is in the interests of society in general
to provide incentives for custodial parents to raise their children to respect rights.27
The point remains, however, that under some circumstances the proposed view
could impose very weak duties on custodial parents to raise their children to respect
rights. The crucial point in defense of this view is that custodial parents, as opposed
to procreative parents, did not bring the child into existence and have no duties to
others to reduce the rights violations of the child - although they do have a duty
not to increase the compensation shortfalls. Furthermore, given that custodial
parents have the rights to control access to the child, and the child has moral
standing, these rights, which restrict the opportunities of the child, must be justified
primarily in terms of the benefits to the child. Children are not (as utilitarians, for
example, would argue) mere pawns for promoting societal interests. The proposed
view, I claim, gets this right.
Paul Churchill argues that parents have a duty to raise their children to be as virtuous
as possible to the extent this is compatible with the child being as happy and as autonomous
as possible. This view iscompatible with the spirit of the proposed view in that it does not
impose duties to others to make the child more virtuous than would involve a sacrifice ofthe
child's interests. See R.Paul Churchill, The Obligationof Parentsto Raise Their Children
26

as Altruists, in MORAL, MARRIAGE, AND PARENTHOOD: AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY

ETHICS (Laurence D. Houlgate ed., 1999). For simplicity, I ignore this very weak, lexical
posterior duty to others.
27 In Equality and the Duties of Procreators,I argue that procreative parents have an
obligation to cover that portion of compensation shortfalls of their offspring that would have
arisen had the child been raised by no one. See Vallentyne, supra note 23.
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V. CONCLUSION

The proposed view of the childrearing rights and duties agrees with common
sense in that, except under extremely rare circumstances, children have certain rights
upon which even their custodial parents may not infringe, and custodial parents have
various duties to look after their wards. The proposed view, however, holds that
children have a much stronger independent moral status than generally supposed.
This greater independence entails both that it is more difficult for individuals to
acquire childrearing rights over children and that the duties owed to children by
those who acquire such rights depend crucially on how much demand there is to
acquire these rights. On the one hand, individuals can acquire childrearing rights
over a child only if their possession of such rights is in the best interest of the child.
Procreative and biological parenthood do not automatically generate these rights.
On the other hand, the special duties of custodial parents to their wards are limited
to the commitments and basic expectations involved in the acquisition of these
rights - which may be minimal if few people want those rights.
Throughout this Essay, I have focused on the moral rights and duties of
childrearing. Although I have defended the child's best interests as a moral
standard, I have not defended it as a legal standard.28 It may not be a standard that
we should adopt legally. Although each of the rights I have discussed is legitimately
enforceable, it does not follow that we should enforce them (via the law or
otherwise). The duty to promote equality will impose some duties to enforce rights,
but, where tradeoffs must be made in promoting equality, some rights violations
may have to be ignored. Assessing whether the best interests of the child should be
adopted as a legal standard would require factoring in problems of limited
information, bias (e.g., against single mothers, minority ethnic groups, and gays or
lesbians), administrative costs, incentive effects, and other matters.29 Extending the
proposed view to a theory of legal rights is thus the topic for another paper.

28 Something like a children's best-interest legal standard is defended in James G. Dwyer,
A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their
Relationships, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 845 (2003).
29 For arguments that children's best interests may not be best served by a legal bestinterest standard, see Elizabeth S.Scott, ParentalAutonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071 (2003), and Emily Buss, Children's Associational Rights?: Why
Less is More, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101 (2003).

